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business. Again, consider the case of Sewell v. Swift 5l in which
the court ignored the fact that the notes were placed in the plain-
tiff's hands with the understanding that they were not to be re-
garded as promissory notes obligating the defendant to pay, but
were to be held by the plaintiff as evidence of an indebtedness
in the event of the defendant's death before the formation of a
certain company. The writer believes that the absurdity of apply-
ing the general rule to such cases is patent when the court ad-
mits that it would reach an opposite decision if a contrary intent
were shown.
In brief the author contends that by judicial decision or by
statute, the rule applicable to ordinary demand notes should be
changed so as to require an actual demand as a condition prece-
dent to the accrual of a cause of action; that being the case the
statute of limitations would not begin to run until the demand
had been made. In this way resort to the "intention rule," at
best always an uncertain and unreliable doctrine, would be rend-
ered unnecessary, and an uniformity, at present unknown in this
field, would be attained.
MALCOLM L. BARTLEY '35.
THE USE OF MANDAMUS IN MISSOURI
Mandamus is a writ of very ancient and obscure origin. It
seems originally to have been one of the many writs or mandates
by which the sovereign of England directed the performance of
any desired act by his subjects. These were not judicial writs,
merely commands. The command being a law in itself from
which there was no appeal, it was not merely declaratory of a
duty under existing law but created the law and imposed the
duty, the performance of which it commanded. It later assumed
a judicial nature, and as a judicial writ mandamus probably ap-
peared in use as early as the 14th and 15th centuries.1 It, how-
ever, did not come into systematic use until the latter part of the
17th century and was then a purely prerogative writ proceeding
from the king himself in the court of King's Bench. Its original
purpose was to prevent disorder from a failure of justice and
defect of police and grew out of the necessity of compelling in-
ferior courts to exercise judicial and ministerial powers invested
in them, by not only restraining their excesses but also prevent-
ing their negligence and restraining their denial of justice.2
The modern writ of mandamus may be defined as a command
57 Ibid.1 High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, (1884), sec. 2. (For convenience
this work will hereinafter be cited merely as "High.")2 Ferris, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, (1926), p. 219.
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issuing from a common law court of competent jurisdiction in
the name of the state or sovereign, directed to some corporation,
officer or inferior court, requiring the performance of a particu-
lar duty therein specified, which duty results from the official
station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from opera-
tion of law.3 Although in England today the writ retains some
of its prerogative features, issuing not of right but at the will of
the sovereign, yet in the United States it is generally held to
have lost its prerogative character, being now merely in the na-
ture of a civil action or proceeding to enforce a legal right.4 And
even though still considered somewhat extraordinary in nature,
its use is not arbitrary with the court, but is governed by fixed
rules and principles.5
A mandamus proceeding is generally classified or regarded as
a civil action, especially as contradistinguished from a criminal
proceeding; and it is a proceeding at common law as distin-
guished from one in equity.6 Judge Lamm of the Missouri Su-
preme Court has referred to mandamus as "a hard and fast writ,
an unreasoning writ, a cast-iron writ, the right arm of the court.
It is," he says, "essentially the exponent of judicial power and
hence is reserved for extraordinary emergencies. '"
Such are the general characteristics of mandamus; in its appli-
cation to specific circumstances there is, as in most categories of
American law, an inevitable lack of uniformity. We shall at-
tempt here to examine the decisions of the Missouri courts which
limit the circumstances under which the writ will issue and de-
termine its availability for judicial control of various types of
official action.
LIMITATIONS ON THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT
I. WHEN THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE
IS INVOLVED
The authorities are not in accord in regard to when the con-
stitutionality of a statute may be challenged in mandamus pro-
ceedings, but the decisions indicate that Missouri courts have
arrived at a somewhat definite conclusion as to the local policy
on this matter. The question generally arises in two ways: (1)
where the relator questions the constitutionality of a statute
which if valid would excuse the respondent from performing the
act or duty sought to be enforced, and (2) where the respondent
3 3 Blackstone Comm. 110; Dunklin County v. County Court (1856) 23
Mo. 449.
4 Ferris, op. cit. p. 221.
5 High, secs. .3, 4, 5.
6 18 R. C. L. 88; In re Nathan Frank (1928) 320 Mo. 1087, 9 S. W. (2d)
153.
7 State ex inf. Kansas City v. Kansas City Gas Co. (1913) 254 Mo. 515,
163 S. W. 854.
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claims that the statute relied on by the relator as imposing on
him the duty sought to be enforced is unconstitutional and there-
fore he is under no obligation to perform such duty.$
The majority of the courts have taken the view that the relator
may attack the constitutionality of the statute relied on by the
respondent as excusing him from the performance of the duty.0
The Missouri courts, however, have apparently taken the opposite
stand and adhere to the general principle that "courts will not
declare an act unconstitutional in an application for a man-
damus.' 1 In the case of State ex rel. Crandall v. McIntosh0 "
the court, intimating that under some circumstances this rule
might not be adhered to, nevertheless asserted that one alleging
an act to be unconstitutional cannot seek by mandamus to compel
action under it, thus affirming the proposition that the constitu-
tionality of a statute cannot be questioned by one who seeks to
avail himself of its provisions. The general principle was also
approved in the later case of State ex rel. Rainwater v. Ross",
denying the relator the right to question the legality of a Local
Option election in a proceeding to compel the county court judges
to grant him a dramshop license. However, in State ex ret.
Kemper v. Carter1 when the validity of a Local Option election
was again contested, the court, indicating that unusual circum-
stances will cause a relaxation of the rules, proceeded to con-
sider the matter as it was inseparably connected with another
point which demanded immediate consideration. And in the case
of State ex rel. Case v. Wilson 3 the Court of Appeals went con-
trary to established principles in restoring to office a major who
was wrongfully removed from same for failure to approve an
ordinance which the court, in the application for reinstatement.
examined and declared invalid.
Although on the second question the authorities are in con-
flict,'4 Missouri has quite uniformly adhered to the doctrine that
"the constitutionality of a statute imposing ministerial duties
upon a ministerial officer cannot be raised by him in a mandamus
proceeding instituted for the purpose of compelling him to per-
form those duties."'1 This rule is based on the theory that only
8 18 R. C. L. 105.
9 18 R. C. L. 106; In re Ayers (1887) 123 U. S. 443.
20 State ex rel. Crandall v. McIntosh (1907) 205 Mo. 589, 103 S. W. 1078;
State ex rel. Buder v. Brand (1924) 305 Mo. 321, 265 S. W. 989.
2o* Supra, note 10.
11 (1912) 245 Mo. 36, 149 S. W. 451; State ex rel. Clark v. Smith (1891)
104 Mo. 661, 16 S. W. 503; State ex rel. Jamison v. Lesueur (1894) 126 Mo.
413, 29 S. W. 278.
12 (1913) 257 Mo. 52, 165 S. W. 773.
'13 (1910) 151 Mo. App. 723, 132 S. W. 625. Here of course, the factual
analogy is not perfect but the same legal principles should control.
14 18 R. C. L. 108; note, 19 St. L. R. 340.
15 State ex rel. Wiles v. Williams (1910) 232 Mo. 56, 133 S. W. 1; State
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those directly affected by the operation of a statute may question
its validity, and that a ministerial officer lacks this necessary
interest. The courts, however, have approved certain exceptions
to this principle, and allow the defense of invalidity to be raised
where the statute has previously been declared invalid by the
court,18 where a case on that issue was at the time pending be-
fore a court,'1 7 or where the refusal to act is based on the advice
of the Attorney General that the statute is unconstitutional."'
More in the nature of a departure from the rule, rather than a
mere exception to it, is the recent case of State ex rel. Cranfill v.
Smith,19 in which the Supreme Court refused to compel city
authorities to submit to a vote an ordinance which if adopted
would be unconstitutional. Though sufficiently different in facts
not to be in conflict with prior decisions, the case clearly indi-
cates a tendency away from a strict construction of the recog-
nized rule.
II. WHEN SOUGHT TO INTERFERE WITH ANOTHER
DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT
Although it is generally recognized that "it is not by the office
of the person to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of the
thing to be done, that the propriety or impropriety of issuing a
mandamus is to be determined," 20 yet there is conflict as to
whether the writ must not be denied as against certain executive
and legislative officers merely because of the nature of their office.
In this respect, Missouri, with a majority of the states, has estab-
lished the doctrine that the governor of the state is, as to the
performance of any and all official duties, entirely removed from
the control of the courts, and that he is beyond the reach of
mandamus not only as to duties of a strictly executive or political
nature, but even as to acts purely ministerial whose performance
the legislature may have required at his hands. And this, even
though he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court.21
This refusal of the judiciary to interfere with the operation of
another department of government is also the basis for the
ex rel. Stokes v. Roach (Mo. 1916) 190 S. W. 277; State ex rel. Thompson
v. Jones (1931) 328 Mo. 267, 41 S. W. (2d) 393.
18 State ex rel. Forgrave v. Hill (1917) 272 Mo. 206, 198 S. W. 844.
1? State ex rel. Stoecker v. Lemay Ferry Sewer Dist. (1933) 332 Mo. 965,
61 S. W. (2d) 724.
is State ex rel. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Becker (1931) 328 Mo.
541, 41 S. W. (2d) 188; State ex rel. Bldg. Assn. v. Brown (Mo. 1934)
68 S. W. (2d) 55.
19 (1932) 330 Mo. 252, 48 S. W. (2d) 891.
2o Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, (1803) 1 Cranch 137
21 High, sec. 120; State ex rel. Robb v. Stone (1893) 120 Mo. 428, 25
S. W. 376; State ex rel. Bartley v. Governor (1867) 39 Mo. 388; the secre-
tary of state however acts for the most part ministerially, and may be
coerced by mandamus. State ex rel. Stokes v. Roach, supra note 15.
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kindred rule that legislative officers, in their purely legislative
functions, are beyond the control of the courts by the writ of
mandamus."2 However, where the duty required of the legislative
officer is simply of a ministerial nature, not calling for the exer-
cise of any special legislative functions nor involving any degree
of official discretion, mandamus may be allowed. Accordingly, it
has been held that the president of a city council may be required
to sign a bill,23 and that a city manager may be compelled to
submit a budget to the city council, which body must then effec-
tuate the plan by ordinance.24 Likewise the writ has issued to
compel a mayor to revoke permits which he has issued illegally.2
On the other hand, the following functions of legislative bodies
and officials have been held beyond control by mandamus: the
determination by the municipal assembly of the qualifications of
its own members, 26 the refusal of the presiding officer of the
Senate to sign a bill,27 the refusal of the Attorney General to
bring a quo warranto proceeding,2 8 and the power of the circuit
court to redistrict the city into Senatorial districts as required
by the Constitution.29 In a recent case, the city clerk in deter-
mining the sufficiency of initiative petitions, was also given this
immunity.20
III. WHEN ACT SOUGHT TO BE COMPELLED IS PROHIBITED
BY LAW OR INJUNCTION
It is well established that mandamus will be denied where it
appears that the acts sought to be coerced are unauthorized or
forbidden by law, or that they tend to aid an unlawful purpose.2 1
With this proposition the Missouri courts have had little diffi-
culty and are in full accord.32 Likewise in accordance with gen-
eral principles, the courts have refused to grant relief when an
injunction is in force against the performance of the duty sought
to be compelled. 8 This doctrine is recognized even though the
party seeking mandamus is not named in the injunction suit; it
22 High, sec. 135.
23 State ex rel. Railroad Co. v. Meier (1897) 143 Mo. 439, 45 S. W. 306.
24 State ex rel. Bd. of Police Commrs. v. Beach (1930) 325 Mo. 175, 28
S. W. (2d) 105.
25 State ex rel. Barricelli v. Noonan (1894) 59 Mo. App. 524.
26 State ex rel. Vogel v. Bersch (1900) 83 Mo. App. 657.
27 State ex rel. Davisson v. Bolte (1899) 151 Mo. 362, 52 S. W. 262.
28 State ex inf. Folk v. Talty (1901) 166 Mo. 529, 66 S. W. 361.
29 State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock (1911) 241 Mo. 433, 146 S. W. 40.
3 State ex rel. Johnson v. Regan (Mo. App. 1934) 76 S. W. (2d) 736.
31 38 C. J. 556.
32 State ex rel. Kent v. Olenhouse (1929) 324 Mo. 49, 23 S. W. (2d) 83;
State ex rel. Motz v. Kelloren (Mo. App. 1925) 271 S. W. 544; State ex rel.
Seeligman v. Hays (1872) 50 Mo. 34; In re Nathan Frank (1928) 320 Mo.
1087, 9 S. W. (2nd) 153.
33 State ex rel. Phelan v. Engelmann (1885) 86 Mo. 551; State ex rel.
Thomas v. Williams (1889) 99 Mo. 291, 12 S. W. 905.
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is sufficient that the defendant was bound thereby.34 But if the
court issuing the injunction had no jurisdiction to do so, the
order is no obstacle to the issuance of mandamus.35 Similarly a
pardon issued by the Governor without authority (because di-
rected against a violation of a city ordinance) has been held not
to bar mandamus to compel execution of the judgment.36
IV. WHEN TITLE OR RIGHT TO OFFICE IS INVOLVED
It is stated as a general rule that the title to an office cannot
be determined in mandamus, the proper remedy usually being
held to be quo warranto or a specific statutory proceeding. 7
Missouri cases support this general doctrine and have invoked it
in a variety of circumstances. Most frequently the issue has
arisen upon application for mandamus to compel the allowance
of a salary for an office to which there is a conflicting claim. It
is the rule that the prima facie right must be recognized, until
all rights are finally determined by contesting the election or by
proceeding in quo warranto, in both of which actions the other
contestant must be a party. Accordingly, where the relator pre-
sents a better right, mandamus will lie in his favor 8 But if
someone other than the relator appears to have the better title,
the writ must be refused.3 9 Likewise where it is sought to deter-
mine a contested title to an office by compelling a counting of the
votes, mandamus will be refused and the parties left to other
remedies, as provided by law. 40 And though when title to an
office is settled, mandamus will lie to compel the delivery of books
and papers belonging to the officer, yet when title thereto is still
in dispute, mandamus is not the proper remedy.41
A somewhat different question arises when the eligibility to
hold office rather than legal title to the office is involved. Such a
case is presented when a claimant seeks to obtain a certificate of
election,' 2 or a certificate of nomination, 43 or the approval of his
34 State ex rel. Davis v. State Highway Comm. (1925) 312 Mo. 230, 279
S. W. 689. This case indicates that a possible exception to the rule exists
where a paramount public interest is involved, yet denies the existence of
such here.
35 State ex rel. School District v. Byers (1878) 67 Mo. 706.
36 State ex rel. Kansas City v. Renick (1900) 157 Mo. 292, 57 S. W. 713.
37 28 C. J. 589.
38 State ex rel. Tolerton v. Gordon (1911) 236 Mo. 142, 139 S. W. 403;
State ex rel. Frank v. Goben (1912) 167 Mo. App. 613, 152 S. W. 93.
39 State ex rel. Jackson v. Auditor (1864) 34 Mo. 375; Winston v. Mose-
ley, Auditor (1864) 35 Mo. 146; State ex rel. Jackson v. State Auditor
(1865) 36 Mo. 70; State ex rel. Simmons v. John (1883) 81 Mo. 13.
4 State ex rel. Bland v. Rodman (1869) 43 Mo. 256; State ex rel. Jami-
son v. Lesueur, supra note 11.
41 State ex rel. Cannon v. May (1891) 106 Mo. 488, 17 S. W. 660; State
ex rel. Tracy v. Taaffe (1887) 25 Mo. App. 567.
42 State ex rel. Snyder v. Newman (1886) 91 Mo. 445, 3 S. W. 849;
State ex rel. Thomas v. Williams, supra note 33.
43 State ex rel. Farris v. Roach (1912) 246 Mo. 56, 150 S. W. 1073.
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bond for office.4" In the last two circumstances the writ will gen-
erally issue, though in the first mandamus is denied. The dis-
tinction is best stated by the following excerpt from a New York
case, frequently quoted with approval by the Missouri courts:
"When the act, the doing of which is sought to be compelled
by mandamus, is the final thing, and if done, gives to the
relator all that he seeks proximately or ultimately, then the
question whether he is entitled to have that act done, may
be inquired into by the officer or person to whom the man-
damus is sought, and is also to be considered by the tribunal
which is moved to grant the mandamus; but where the act
to be done is but a step towards the final result, and is but
the means of setting in motion a tribunal which is to decide
upon the right to the final relief claimed, then the inferior
officer or tribunal may not inquire whether there exists the
right to the final relief, and can only ask whether the relator
shows a right to have the act done which is sought from him
or it."'
45
It has been repeatedly asserted that mandamus is the proper
remedy for restoration to public office after improper removal.*'
This is approved by Missouri decisions, along with the recognized
exception that mandamus does not lie to induct a claimant into
an office already filled by a person with color of right. The
remedy in such a ease is by quo warranto, thus giving the de
facto officer a hearing. Mandamus can only be used where the
relator holds the uncontested title or where his title has been
adjudicated and finally established by a competent tribunal .4
However, where the office is filled by a mere intruder with no
color of right, mandamus will lie, for title to office is not in-
volved and only the validity of the ouster is questioned. 48
V. WHEN SOUGHT TO COMPEL ACTS UNAVAILING, IMPOSSIBLE,
OR ALREADY PERFORMED
It is a fundamental principle of the law of mandamus that the
writ will never be granted in cases where, if issued, it would
prove unavailing.49 In the Missouri cases this principle has been
44 State ex rel. Cameron v. Shannon (1895) 133 Mo. 139, 33 S. W. 1137;
State ex rel. Sanders v. Wear (1889) 37 Mo. App. 325; Ibbetson v. Schulz
(Mo. App. 1933) 64 S. W. (2d) 313.
45 People ex rel. v. Canal Appraisers (1878) 73 N. Y. 443.
46 18 R. C. L. 264; State ex rel. Kansas City v. Coon (1926) 316 Mo. 524,
296 S. W. 90.
47 State ex rel. Gallagher v. Kansas City (1927) 319 Mo. 705, 7 S. W.
(2d) 357.
48 St. Louis County Court v. Sparks (1846) 10 Mo. 117; State ex rel.
Guion v. Miles (1907) 210 Mo. 127, 109 S. W. 595; State ex rel. Case v.
Wilson (1910) 151 Mo. App. 723, 132 S. W. 625.
49 High, sec. 14.
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invoked as grounds for refusing to issue the writ where the acts
sought to be compelled are impossible of performance, or for
some reason, even if performed, would be ineffective, or where
the acts have already been performed and there is therefore
nothing remaining which mandamus should direct to be done.
Often there is an element of uncertainty as to what would be the
ultimate effect of the writ; in such cases this is a matter to be
considered by the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion.
An act has been deemed impossible of performance when the
party against whom the writ is invoked has no power to execute
its mandate, 0 or where a compliance with the mandate would
require the expenditure of funds which the respondent does not
possess and which he has no means of obtaining.51 The futility
of compliance with the writ as a ground for its denial has most
frequently arisen in those cases where the time for exercising
the right which it is sought to enforce by mandamus, has nearly,
if not completely expired.52
In another group of cases mandamus has been refused to re-
instate a discharged officer for irregularities in removal proceed-
ings when it is acknowledged there was sufficient cause for re-
moval and he would undoubtedly be removed on restoration.53
More often the writ has been refused because the acts sought
to be compelled have already been performed. Accordingly, where
the relator sought a certificate of indebtedness only to call the
matter to the attention of the legislature, but it appeared they
50 High, sec. 14; State ex rel. Onion v. Supreme Temple Pythian Sisters
(1932) 227 Mo. App. 557, 54 S. W. (2d) 468; State ex rel. Smith v. Platte
County Court (1884) 83 Mo. 539.
51 18 R. C. L. 140; State ex rel. Wilcox v. Draper (1872) 50 Mo. 24;
State ex rel. Special Road District v. Holman, (1924) 305 Mo. 195, 264
S. W. 908; State ex rel. Special Road District v. Cole County (Mo. 1927)
300 S. W. 267.
52 State ex rel. Williams v. Harrison (1902) 173 Mo. 19, 72 S. W. 1072
(time in which license was to be effective had expired); State ex rel. Hugh-
lett v. Finley (1898) 74 Mo. App. 213 (term of office had nearly expired).
is State ex rel. Stickle v. Martin (1916) 195 Mo. App. 366, 191 S. W.
1064; State ex rel. Young v. Temperance Benev. Assn. (1890) 42 Mo. App.
485. Similarly in State ex rel. Castlio v. Edwards (1881) 11 Mo. App. 152
the court refused to compel a trial judge to enter judgment on a verdict
where in the exercise of his discretion he had granted a new trial, being
satisfied that the verdict was obtained by the perjury of a party in interest.
Though he be required to enter judgment, he would still be bound to set
it aside for cause. Recognizing the general rule, the court in State ex rel.
Scanland v. Thompson (1916) 196 Mo. App. 12, 187 S. W. 804 created an
exception and issued mandamus in favor of a widow to enforce her abso-
lute right to appointment as administratrix. There being no appeal from
a refusal to grant letters, and the admitted objections to her serving not
constituting absolute disqualification, the court was bound to grant the
letters. Any objections could be used in removal proceedings from which
an appeal would lie.
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already knew of it, mandamus was denied. 4 Often performance
is subsequent to the issuance of the alternative writ in which
case the proper procedure is to refuse to make it peremptory. 5
In this connection it has been pointed out that mandamus was
never intended to be invoked simply to demonstrate the existence
of the State's power. It is properly invoked to remedy "rights
that lack assistance or wrongs that need resistance."' 0
VI. WHEN SOUGHT TO ENFORCE PRIVATE RIGHTS
From what has already been said it is obvious that mandamus
lies only for the enforcement of duties incumbent by law upon
the person or body against whom the coercive power of the court
is invoked. Therefore contract rights of a private or personal
nature, involving no question of trust or of official duty, cannot
be enforced by mandamus.57 Nor is the remedy appropriate to
command the performance of a duty at the hands of one who
does not occupy an official or quasi-official relation.,, So generally
is this proposition recognized and acquiesced in that it has re-
ceived only slight attention by the Missouri courts. In an early
case the Supreme Court stated the rule that mandamus does not
lie to enforce simple common law rights between individuals
based on contract for the payment of money. 9 Accordingly it
was later held that the writ will not lie against a mere private
person compelling him to produce books of a private nature de-
tained by him.60 It was subsequently decided that mandamus
could not issue against an executrix as she is a mere trustee en-
gaged in administering a private trust and holds neither an
official nor quasi-official position.-
SCOPE OF THE WRIT
In considering the variety of functions against which man-
damus may be directed, it must be borne in mind that the most
prolific source of controversy in the use of this writ has been the
fundamental rule, often difficult of application, that mandamus
cannot be used to dictate an act which is discretionary in char-
acter. The person against whom the writ is invoked may be
54 State ex rel. Wilcox v. Draper, supra note 51.
55 State ex rel. Ranney v. MacChesney (1911) 237 Mo. 670, 141 S. W.
640; State ex rel. Meyers v. Shinnick (Mo. 1929) 19 S. W. (2d) 676; State
ex rel. Clement v. Stokes (1903) 99 Mo. App. 236, 73 S. W. 254.
56 State ex rel. Thompson v. Board of Regents (1924) 305 Mo. 57, 264
S. W. 693.
r, High, sec. 25; Payne v. School District (1901) 87 Mo. App. 415.
5s High, sec. 25.
59 State ex rel. Bohannon v. Howard County Court (1867) 39 Mo. 375.
60 State ex rel. Cooper County v. Trent (1875) 58 Mo. 571.
61 State ex rel. Lionberger v. Tolle (1880) 71 Mo. 645. The court also
held as sufficient reason for refusing the writ that the probate court has
ample authority to compel the executrix to perform her duty under the law.
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compelled to exercise his discretion but cannot be compelled to
act in a particular way. However, if the act in question is purely
a ministerial duty involving no discretion on the part of the
person charged with the duty to act, mandamus will lie to com-
pel the discharge of that duty. In this respect a ministerial act
has been defined as "one which a public officer is required to
perform upon a given state of facts in a prescribed manner in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard
to his own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety or im-
propriety of the act to be performed." 62
A qualification of the above rule has been recognized to the
extent that when an inferior tribunal or official body charged
with the performance of a discretionary duty is guilty of a gross
and palpable violation of the discretion confided to it, mandamus
may lie to command its due exercise.6 3 This exception is based
on the idea that the abuse of discretion may be such a gross eva-
sion of a positive duty that it is equivalent to a refusal to per-
form the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law.64
That this rule, together with its exception, has always been a
part of the Missouri law, cannot be disputed. And the court in
considering whether to grant or refuse a mandamus in a particu-
lar case, is in every instance guided by the principles stated
above, subject of course, to the other considerations pointed out
in the preceding sections of this article.
However, it is within the province of the courts in each case to
decide whether an act sought to be enforced is or is not minis-
terial,65 and the distinctions drawn are often arbitrary ones, rec-
ognized only in order to reach a desired result. Thus additional
flexibility is given to the scope of the writ in addition to that
already existing because of the discretion as to its issuance in-
herent in the court.
I. IN THE FIELD OF TAXATION
Mandamus has been used in the field of taxation in Missouri
in several ways. Most often it has been utilized to compel a public
body to levy a tax to pay off an indebtedness. To this end it has
issued against municipal corporations, or their officers or trus-
tees,66 judges of the county court,67 and supervisors of various
62 Finkelnburg and Williams, Missouri Appellate Practice, (2d ed. 1906),
p. 228; State ex tel. Railroad Co. v. Meier, supra note 23.
63 Finkelnburg and Williams, op. cit., p. 229.
64 18 R. C. L. 126.
e6 38 C. J. 597.
66 Flagg v. Mayor of City of Palmyra (1863) 33 Mo. 440; State ex Tel.
Rogers v. Hug (1869) 44 Mo. 116; State ex tel. Cassidy v. Slavens (1882)
75 Mo. 508; Hambleton v. Town of Dexter (1886) 89 Mo. 188, 1 S. W. 234.
67 State ex tel. White v. Clay County (1870) 46 Mo. 231; State ex tel.
Frazer v. Holt County Court (1896) 135 Mo. 533, 37 S. W. 521.
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levee, school and sewer districts.,, From this group of decisions
it has become the law of this state that mandamus will issue to
compel a municipal corporation to levy a tax to pay a judgment
obtained against the city.8 It was originally required that execu-
tion on this judgment must have issued and have been returned
unsatisfied,70 but a later case indicates that it is sufficient to state
that the town has no property whereon to levy execution and no
money in the treasury subject to the payment of the judgment."
However, when a city has taxed to the limit of its statutory
authority, mandamus will not issue to compel the levy of a spe-
cial tax, even for the satisfaction of a tort judgment.72 From
what has already been pointed out, it necessarily follows that
mandamus will not lie to compel the levy of a tax for payment
of warrants drawn on a municipal corporation treasury before
the warrants have been reduced to judgment.73 Yet it is a recog-
nized exception that when the debt is to be paid from a special
fund or is being asserted against officers of a special district,
such as the supervisors of a levee district, no judgment is neces-
sary.
74
In these cases the court assumed that the duty in each instance
was a ministerial one. In the case of State ex rel. Carpeiter v.
St. Louis"s it was held that when a special tax has been author-
ized by the people, the duty to levy it is ministerial and the writ
will lie. Accordingly it is recognized that when any specific min-
isterial duty, mapdatory in nature, is imposed on an officer or
board, with respect to the levy, assessment and application of
taxes mandamus will lie to compel its performance.
68 State ex rel. McWilliams v. Bates (1911) 235 Mo. 262, 138 S. W. 482;
State ex rel. Boatmen's Bank v. Sewer District (1930) 327 Mo. 594, 37
S. W. (2d) 905; State ex rel. Stoecker v. Lemay Ferry Sewer Dist., supra
note 17.
69 State ex rel. Cassidy v. Slavens, supra note 66; Heather v. City of
Palmyra (1925) 311 Mo. 32, 276 S. W. 872. See also R. S. Mo. (1929) see.
1233.
70 Cloud v. Inhabitants of Pierce City (1885) 86 Mo. 357.
71 Hambleton v. Town of Dexter, supra note 66.
72 State ex rel. Emerson v. Mound City (Mo. 1934) 73 S. W. (2d) 1017.
The court pointed out though, that it is no defense to the tort action that
the taxation limit has already been reached. This case, in placing Missouri
in accord with the prevailing view, overruled a prior group of contra deci-
sions creating an exception in favor of tort judgments. See State ex rel.
Poole v. Willow Springs (Mo. 1915) 183 S. W. 589.
73 State ex rel. Jeffries v. Trustees, Town of Pacific (1875) 61 Mo. 155.
74 Sheridan v. Fleming (1887) 93 Mo. 321, 5 S. W. 813; State ex rel. Mc-
Williams v. Bates (1911) 235 Mo. 262, 138 S. W. 482.
75 (1927) 318 Mo. 870, 2 S. W. (2d) 713.
76 State ex rel. Zoolog. Board v. St. Louis (1927) 318 Mo. 910, 1 S. W.
(2d) 1021; this doctrine has been invoked in a variety of circumstances.
In State ex rel. Thompson v. Jones (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1931, 41 S. W. (2d) 39)
mandamus was awarded to compel the county clerk to compute and extend
taxes on certain personality omitted by the county assessor from the assess-
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A somewhat different use of the writ in this field, though by
no means unique in Missouri,77 was allowed in American Mfg. Co.
v. Al t, 7 where the court held that where one is threatened by a
tax-collecting officer with prosecution unless he pays a tax, he
may tender the amount he deems due and on refusal of the col-
lector to accept it, proceed by mandamus to ascertain his rights.
Likewise in the case of State ex rel. Flaugh v. Jaudon'9 man-
damus was allowed to compel the city to accept as full taxes the
amount tendered, representing the tax before the raise, in order
to thus determine whether the 20% tax increase over the amount
tendered was valid.
II. IN THE ISSUING OF LICENSES
The cases in which mandamus has been sought to compel the
issuance of a license fall into several well-defined categories. The
Missouri decisions uniformly support the accepted rules that
when the duty to issue a license is a ministerial one, mandamus
will lie, but that where the granting of the license is a matter
of discretion, mandamus cannot be invoked unless that discretion
has been arbitrarily exercised.80 It has been suggested8' that in
order to impose a valid license fee under the police power, some
qualified officer must exercise a discretion in the issuance of the
license. But where the fee is exacted under the taxing power the
license must be issued to all applicants tendering the prescribed
fee.8 2 Yet in considering whether or not mandamus is to issue,
any distinction founded strictly on a discretion-non-discretion ra-
tionale is questionable and the true basis of the decisions seems
ment books and thereafter placed on said books and the valuation thereof
fixed by the State Tax Commission. Likewise in State ex rel. Thompson v.
Dirckx (Mo. 1928) 11 S. W. (2d) 38, the State Board of Equalization was
granted mandamus to compel the county board to adjust its tax books to
conform to the order of the state board as to the assessment of a particular
class of property. In State ex rel. Insurance Co. v. Hyde (1921) 292 Mo.
342, 241 S. W. 396 mandamus was admitted to be the proper remedy to
compel the Superintendent of the Insurance Department to certify to the
State Auditor the amount of tax due from a foreign life insurance company
and to compel the State Treasurer to receive and accept such amount in
payment of taxes.
77 38 C. J. 781.
fs (Mo. 1915) 184 S. W. 1167.
79 (1920) 286 Mo. 181, 227 S. W. 48.
80 18 R. C. L. 292.
S Wilmer T. Fox in 66 Central Law Journal 314.
82 However, as shall be pointed out, Missouri decisions have in some cases
refused to recognize the existence of a discretion even though the license
statute be an exercise of the police power. No mandamus cases on a license
for taxing purposes have arisen in this state but it seems likely that as
such statutes merely require the payment of a license fee and in some cases
the submission of a special deposit or bond, that the duty to issue the license
will be held ministerial. See R S. Mo. (1929) sec. 10105 (itinerant vendors);
R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 13190 (employment agencies).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss4/12
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
to be the nature of the act or business sought to be licensed, sub-
ject to exceptions in some instances where the express wording
of the pertinent statutes so demand.
In those instances where the business sought to be licensed
bears only an incidental relation to public health, welfare or
morals, generally the only statutory prerequisites for a license
are the performance of certain definitely specified acts, and it has
been held that in such cases the duty to license is ministerial, and
subject to control by the court. So where the ordinance only re-
quired payment of a fee and the filing of a certificate from the
board of health to the effect that the party had filed a statement
in compliance with another section of the ordinance, the duty to
issue a license for the removal of garbage upon compliance with
these provisions is ministerial. 3 Likewise in State ex rel. Jones
v. Cooks, it was held that under R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 1277, regu-
lating the licensing of private banking establishments, and pro-
viding that "in each case the Secretary of State shall find that all
the provisions of the law have been complied with by the insti-
tution herein named which desires to be authorized to do busi-
ness, he shall grant them a certificate to that effect" the duty was
ministerial and mandamus would lie.85 However, where a license
for the construction of a sidewalk was sought in State ex ret.
Connon v. St. Louis88 it was held that the word "may" appearing
in the ordinance invested the licensing official with a discretion
and mandamus could not issue.
At the other extreme are those cases where it is sought to ob-
tain a license to practice a profession such as medicine or den-
tistry. Here, because of the intimate connection between the
vocation and the public health, the courts are reluctant to inter-
fere with the action of the licensing officials. Hence the statutes
have been liberally construed as conferring discretionary powers
free from control by the judiciary. Accordingly it has been
stated as the policy that "whenever an element, shred, or degree
83 St. Louis v. Weitzel (1895) 130 Mo. 600, 31 S. W. 1045.
84 (1902) 174 Mo. 100, 73 S. W. 489.
85 Of a similar nature is the Missouri Blue Sky Law (R. S. Mo. 1929,
sec. 7744) which provides that "if the commissioner shall find that the ap-
plicant is of good repute and has complied with the provisions of this sec-
tion including the payment of the fee hereinafter provided he shall register
such applicant as a dealer upon his filing a bond in the sum of $5,000."
Though the courts have not yet passed upon whether mandamus will lie
under this statute it seems likely they will be guided by the decision on the
private banking license law and hold the duty thereby imposed to be min-
isterial. Like treatment, if the occasion arises will probably be accorded
similar statutes providing for licenising of itinerant vendors (supra, note
82), employment agencies (supra, note 82), registered motor vehicle oper-
ators (R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 7766) and egg dealers (R. S. Mo. 1929, see.
13059).
86 (1900) 158 Mo. 505, 59 S. W. 1101.
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of discretion enters into the duty to be performed, the functions
of mandatory authority are shorn of their customary potency
and become powerless to dictate terms to that discretion."87 In
that case mandamus was refused and a discretion held to exist
in the state board of health as to granting a license to practice
medicine, although the statute was mandatory in wording and
under it the only function of the board was to find that the rela-
tor's diploma was genuine and that the person named therein
was the person claiming and presenting the same.18 Likewise
held to confer discretionary powers on the board of health are
statutes conferring the right to refuse a medical license to in-
dividuals guilty of unprofessional or dishonorable conduct,8 9 or
to applicants presenting degrees from questionable colleges. 0
But in the case of State ex rel. McCleary v. Adcock l it was held
that when all such conditions of the act were admittedly complied
with and the board of health had only to determine the pure fact
question as to whether or not the applicant was in school at a
certain date, the duty was a ministerial one which could be con-
trolled by mandamus.
As to the function of the Dental Board a somewhat different
rule has been established. In State ex rel. Wolfe v. Dental Board"2
it was finally settled that as the granting of a certificate of regis-
tration was based on an examination there was a discretion and
mandamus would not lie.93 But as the statute provided that on
presentation of the certificate of registration and payment of a
nominal license fee "the applicant shall be entitled to a license"94
it was held that the granting of such license and all annual re-
newals thereof was a mere ministerial function, all question as
to the applicant's qualifications being eliminated by the granting
87 State ex rel. Granville v. Gregory (1884) 83 Mo. 123.
88 Act of April 2, 1883. It read "If the diploma is found to be genuine
and if the person named therein be the person claiming and presenting the
same, the state board of health shall (italics by the writer) issue its cer-
tificate to that effect .... and such diploma and certificate shall be deemed
conclusive as to the right of the lawful holder of the same to practice medi-
cine in this state." Note however that this differs little from the private
banking license law which was held to create only a ministerial function.
89 R. S. Mo. (1889), sec. 6878; State ex rel. Hathaway v. State Board of
Health (1890) 103 Mo. 22, 15 S. W. 322.
90 R. S. Mo. (1889), sec. 6872; State ex rel. Johnston v. Lutz (1896) 136
Mo. 633, 38 S. W. 323.
91 (1907) 206 Mo. 550, 105 S. W. 270.
92 (1921) 289 Mo. 520, 233 S. W. 390.
93 Though to date the matter has not been presented, it seems likely that
statutes regulating the licensing of druggists (R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 13141)
and nurses (R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 13486), which also provided that qualifica-
tion for the license shall be based on the results of an examination, will
necessarily receive the same construction by the courts in a mandamus pro-
ceeding.
94 See. 5489, Laws 1917, p. 256.
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of the registration certificate. Though apparently limiting the
discretionary character of the duties of the board, the necessary
safeguards are preserved under this ruling.
Where the license is sought for the operation of a dramshop or
pool room a wide discretion is generally granted. The statutory
language often embraces this result, and even where it is not
clear discretion has been preserved by the courts' interpretation
that such statutes confer a privilege rather than a right.5 Ac-
cordingly, the policy has been indicated that any doubt as to the
discretion of licensing officials is to be resolved in their favor.0
The statutes generally establish certain conditions prerequisite
to the granting of a license and then provide that the officials
"shall have power to license."1' 7 The cases have decided that such
laws merely prescribe a qualification for a privilege and do not
confer a vested right, since many other considerations, such as
the location of the proposed business, or the expediency of hav-
ing another such shop in the town, still remain to affect the dis-
cretion of the court.9 8 In the licensing of pool halls it has even
been said that under the statute "the county court has the right
to refuse to license without giving any reason whatever other
than they may determine that such an institution in a community
is a nuisance."' 9
However, where the statute is explicit and provides that "if
the court shall be of the opinion that the applicant is a law-abid-
ing person . . . . and the petition required . . . . contains the
proper names subscribed thereto...., then the court shall grant
such license,"' 00 the duty is considered ministerial and mandamus
will lie to compel issuance of the license if the applicant complies
with all requirements.' 0' Still it has been held that a discretion
exists as to whether these prerequisites have been satisfied and
this in some cases may warrant refusal of the writ.102 Where,
however, as with the board of health in granting medical licenses,
95 State ex rel. Hawkins v. Harris (1924) 304 Mo. 309, 263 S. W. 807;
State ex rel. Gazzalo v. Hudson (1882) 13 Mo. App. 61.
96 State ex rel. Gumperts v. Higgins (1900) 84 Mo. App. 531.
97 R. S. Mo. (1919), sec. 9644 (pool room license). In R. S. Mo. (1909),
sec. 7191 regulating the licensing of dramshops, it is provided that "if the
court shall be of the opinion that the applicant is a law abiding citizen
above 21 years of age, the court may grant a license."
98 State ex rel. Brown v. Stiff (1903) 104 Mo. App. 685, 78 S. V. 675;
State ex rel. McClanahan v. DeWitt (1911) 160 Mo. App. 304, 142 S. W.
366.99 State ex rel. Hawkins v. Harris, supra note 95.
100 R. S. Mo. (1909), sec. 7191 (dramshop license statute).
101 State ex rel. Heller v. Thornhill (1913) 174 Mo. App. 469, 160 S. W.
558; State ex rel. Sheffel v. McCammon (1905) 111 Mo. App. 626, 86 S. W.
510; State ex rel. Hanks and Miller v. Packett (1909) 136 Mo. App. 700,
119 S. W. 25. These furnish an interesting comparison with the treatment
accorded the medical and banking license statutes.
102 State ex rel. Heller v. Thornhill, supra note 101.
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the licensing body admits the existence of all qualifications and
the only dispute is over the amount of the license to be paid, the
determination is one which may be controlled by mandamus.10 3
III. IN THE ALLOWANCE AND PAYMENT OF CLAIMS
Active use has been made of mandamus in compelling the
proper authorities to allow and pay claims held by the relator
against public bodies. It has been held that the county court in
refusing to allow an account, exercises a discretion and its action
cannot be controlled by mandamus. 10 4 Yet where the claim is re-
duced to judgment, or has already been audited and allowed by
another official body, or where the amount is a sum fixed by law
as a salary and there is no disputed fact to be determined in
order to arrive at the amount, mandamus will lie to compel the
court to issue a warrant for it, this being a mere ministerial func-
tion.105 That the State Auditor occupies a similar position seems
to be equally settled, and accordingly, where the claims have been
authorized by law or approved by some official board, his duty
to draw a warrant on the state treasurer may be compelled by
mandamus. 06 However in all other cases, where the claim against
the State is in the first instance presented to him for allowance,
he is vested with a discretion which cannot be interfered with
if it is properly exercised. 07 In this connection, it has been held
that he acts properly in refusing to audit or draw a warrant for
a claim for which no appropriation has been made.10 8
It is quite uniformly recognized that the disbursing officer, the
treasurer in most instances, is under a duty to honor a warrant
properly drawn on him, if funds for its payment are available;
and this ministerial function may be enforced by mandamus.,'0
However, when the payment of the warrant would require a
103 State ex rel. Shaw v. Baker (1888) 32 Mo. App. 98.
104 State ex rel. Watkins v. Macon County Court (1878) 68 Mo. 29; State
ex rel. Smith v. Platte County Court (1884) 83 Mo. 539. R. S. Mo. (1929),
se. 7184 however provides that if the proper official fails to pass on a claim
within a reasonable time he may be compelled by mandamus to act in the
matter.
105 State ex rel. Baker v. Fraker (1901) 166 Mo. 130, 65 S. W. 720; State
ex rel. Koehler v. Bulger (1921) 289 Mo. 441, 233 S. W. 486; State ex rel.
Holman v. Trimble (1926) 316 Mo. 1041, 293 S. W. 98; Perkins v. Burks(Mo. 1935), 78 S. W. (2d) 845; State ex rel. Stipp v. Cornish (1929) 223
Mo. App. 978, 24 S. W. (2d) 667.
106 Stnte ex rel. Treas. State Lunatic Asylum v. State Auditor (1870)
46 Mo. 326; State ex rel. Hawes v. Mason (1899) 153 Mo. 23, 54 S. W. 524;
State ex rel. Meals v. Hackman (Mo. 1919) 217 S. W. 271.107 State ex rel. Gehner v. Thompson (1926) 316 Mo. 1169, 293 S. W. 391.
108 State ex rel. Murray v. Brown (1879) 141 Mo. 21, 41 S. W. 911; State
ex rel. Buder v. Hackmann (1924) 305 Mo. 342, 265 S. W. 532.109 State ex rel. Thomas v. Treas. Callaway County (1869) 43 Mo. 228;
State f-e rel. Ins. Agents' Assn. v. Kansas City (1927) 319 Mo. 386, 4 S. W.
(2d) 427; State ex rel. Nolen v. Nelson (1925) 310 Mo. 526, 275 S. W. 927;
State ex rel. Hixson v. Nerry (1904) 105 Mo. App. 458, 79 S. W. 993.
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decision by the treasurer on a question of law, mandamus must
be refused, since he lacks the capacity to act in the matter.110
IV. IN CONTROLLING THE JUDICIAL ACTION OF COURTS
By virtue of Article VI, Sections 3, 12, and 23, of the Missouri
Constitution, the circuit courts, Courts of Appeals, and the Su-
preme Court are given superintending control over inferior
courts and tribunals, and as an incident of such control are given
power to issue Writs of mandamus.
In the exercise of such power, however, the courts have been
limited by several generally accepted legal principles. Predomi-
nant among these restrictions is the rule that mandamus cannot
interfere with the discretion of a judicial body.",' The remedy is
rather by appeal from the judicial action." 2 Accordingly, it
seems to now be established in Missouri that mandamus will not
lie to review the discretion of a lower court in refusing to issue
a mandamus. When the lower court has jurisdiction to deter-
mine the question whether the petition states a cause for the
issuance of an alternative writ of mandamus, its determination
is a judicial act which cannot be controlled by mandamus."' And
when it was sought to compel the lower court to change a judg-
ment already rendered and enter another one, mandamus has
been refused."1 4 However, when a court wrongfully refuses to
act in a case, mandamus is admittedly the proper remedy to com-
pel it to take jurisdiction and deliver a judgment on the merits."5
But the writ may not determine what particular judgment shall
be rendered.116 So, if the court has declined to hear the merits of
the cause on a preliminary objection to its jurisdiction, man-
damus will lie if the lower court misconstrued the law or made
an erroneous finding of the facts as to this preliminary point.'
110 State ex rel. Sweaney v. Gentry (1905) 112 Mo. App. 589, 87 S. W. 68.
11 State ex rel. Lashly v. Wurdeman (Mo. 1916) 187 S. W. 257; Trainer
v. Porter (1870) 45 Mo. 336.
112 State ex rel. Lashly v. Wurdeman, supra note 111.
11 State ex rel. Tate v. Sevier (Mo. 1933) 68 S. W. (2d) 50. In assert-
ing this to be the rule, the Supreme Court ignored an apparently contraholding by the Court of Appeals, State ex rel. Sharp v. Knight (1930) 224
Mo. App. 761, 26 S. W. (2d) 1011.
114 State ex rel. Sparks v. Wilson (1871) 49 Mo. 146; State ex rel. Smith
v. Platte County Court, supra note 104; State ex rel. Burton v. Bagby
(1921) 288 Mo. 482, 232 S. W. 474.
I's Ex parte Cox (1847) 10 Mo. 742; State ex rel. Huey v. Cape Girar-
deau Court Common Pleas (1881) 73 Mo. 560; State ex rel. Meinhard v.
Stratton (1892) 110 Mo. 426, 19 S. W. 803.
116 Miltenberger v. St. Louis County Court (1872) 50 Mo. 172; State ex
rel. Monett Milling Co. v. Neville (1900) 157 Mo. 386, 57 S. W. 1012.
117 Castello v. St. Louis Circuit Court (1859) 28 Mo. 259; State ex rel.
Harris v. Laughlin (1882) 75 Mo. 358; State ex rel. Bayha v. Philips (1888)
97 Mo. 331, 10 S. W. 855; State ex rel. Field v. Ellison (1918) 277 Mo. 46,
209 S. W. 107.
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Likewise, where the court assumes jurisdiction of a case on ap-
peal, and then proceeds to dispose of it, but not on the merits,
mandamus will issue to compel it to exercise its whole jurisdic-
tion in the appeal, and to determine all issues presented therein.1 8
But where a justice of the peace exceeded his limited powers and
dismissed a complaint for insufficiency after a jury was paneled,
he was not exercising judicial power or discretion and mandamus
was held to be the proper remedy to compel him to proceed with
the trial.11 In all such cases an absolute duty to hear the cause
is imposed on the court; it has no discretion in the matter.
The courts also recognize the rule that an abuse of judicial dis-
cretion may be corrected by mandamus; for when it is arbitrarily
exercised, a discretion is regarded as abandoned. So although it
may be in the court's discretion as to when a certain inquiry shall
be held, it is bound to have this done within a reasonable time.
A delay of four months in the case of State ex rel. South St.
Joseph Town Co. v. Mosman was declared an abuse of discretion
which could be corrected by mandamus.120
Similarly, during the course of the disposition of a case, the
duty to perform many other judicial acts might become man-
datory on the courts and subject to be compelled by mandamus.
It has accordingly been held that in proper cases the writ lies to
compel the court to receive a good verdict of a jury,1 2 1 and to
enter up a judgment,1 2 or, having done so, to order a writ of
execution to issue on the judgment. 23 Likewise, where the law
secures the right of appeal to a party, and he has done every-
thing necessary to entitle him to it, mandamus will issue to se-
cure this right if it has been wrongfully denied by the court. 2 4
And when an inferior court has been commanded by a superior
tribunal to act in a certain specific manner, it has no discretion
118 State ex rel. Modern Woodmen of America v. Broaddus (1911) 239
Mo. 359, 143 S. W. 455. This decision was finally reached only after a line
of contra cases had been established holding that even such a ruling was
a judicial act and a final decision with which mandamus cannot interfere.
This opposite view was also taken by the United States Supreme Court in
"In re Key" (1902) 189 U. S. 84.
119 State ex rel. Benson v. Brooks (1912) 167 Mo. App. 619, 150 S. W.
725.
120 (Mo. App. 1916) 187 S. W. 1122.
121 State ex rel. Webster v. Knight (1870) 46 Mo. 83.
122Vernon and Blake v. Boggs (1821) 1 Mo. 117; State ex rel. Wright v.
Adams (1882) 76 Mo. 605. As in State ex rel. Albers v. Horner (1881) 10
Mo. App. 307 this use is often made of the writ when the judge is about
to set aside the jury's verdict erroneously for cause not permitted. In no
case, though, can this interfere with a properly exercised discretion.
12 State ex rel. Kansas City v. Renick (1900) 157 Mo. 292, 57 S. W.
713; State ex rel. Capitain v. Graves (Mo. 1916) 190 S. W. 859.
124 State ex rel. Spickerman v. Allen (1887) 92 Mo. 20, 4 S. W. 414; In
re Campbell (Mo. 1929) 19 S. W. (2d) 752; State ex rel. Millet v. Field
(1889) 37 Mo. App. 83.
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and its duty to follow such directions may be enforced by man-
damus.1
25
Numerous other cases may be found in which a court, by means
of constitutional provision or legislative enactment, 126 a mandate
from a superior court, 2 7 or by operation of law,1 28 is stripped of
its usual judicial discretion and clothed with a mere ministerial
duty, the performance of which may be compelled by mandamus.
But in each case it is essential to ascertain that an absolute duty
has been imposed, not a mere authority to act; leaving in the
court's discretion the ultimate decision whether or not to do so,
with which discretion of course, mandamus cannot interfere, un-
less it has been arbitrarily exercised.1 2
V. TO COMPEL THE PERFORMANCE OF VARIOUS OTHER
MINISTERIAL DUTIES IMPOSED UPON PUBLIC OFFICIALS
A variety of cases may be found considering the ministerial
functions of various public officials, but not falling strictly within
any of the aforementioned categories. For the most part, as in
the cases already examined, the writ has been granted or refused
according to whether the action sought to be compelled is thought
to be ministerial or discretionary, subject always of course to the
exception that an abuse of discretion likewise is subject to cor-
rection by mandamus.
In a number of cases the writ has been invoked against direc-
tors of school districts or the boards of education. Consequently
it seems now to be settled that the duties of such bodies to use
certain books that have been selected by a superior authority,1 0
125 State ex rel. Knisely v. Holteamp (1915) 266 Mo. 347, 181 S. W. 1007;
State ex rel. Powell v. McCarty (Mo. 1921) 240 S. W. 1085; State ex rel.
Wattenbarger v. Lamb (1913) 174 Mo. App. 360, 160 S. W. 55.
126 State ex rel. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Philips (1888) 96 Mo. 570, 10 S. W.
182 involved the constitutional duty of the Court of Appeals to transfer a
cause to the Supreme Court when one judge is of the opinion that their
decision conflicts with a prior ruling of the Supreme Court. In Bennett v.
McCaffery (1887) 28 Mo. App. 220 the justice of the peace was under a
statutory duty to certify the case to the circuit court when an affidavit that
the suit involved the title to realty as an issue therein had been filed before
the justice. The case of Beck v. Jackson (1868) 43 Mo. 117 concerned the
statutory duty to pass on the sufficiency of a bond presented by one with
prima facie evidence of title to office. But as there is a discretion the court
cannot be compelled to approve the bond.
127 Boone County v. Todd (1832) 3 Mo. 140 (an order from the circuit
court requiring the county court to direct their treasurer to pay a bill);
Railroad Co. v. Morgan County Court (1873) 53 Mo. 156 (an order to
deliver up bonds to the county fiscal agent).
128 State ex rel. Carter v. Bollinger (1908) 219 Mo. 204, 117 S. W. 1132;
State ex rel. Road Dist. v. Burton (1920) 283 Mo. 41, 222 S. W. 844; State
ex rel. Lashly v. Wurdeman (1914) 183 Mo. App. 28, 166 S. W. 348.
129 State ex rel. Howell County v. Howell County Court (1875) 58 Mo.
583; Railroad Co. v. Buchanan County Court (1867) 39 Mo. 485; State ex
rel. Curts v. Thomas (1904) 183 Mo. 220,-82 S. W. 106; State ex rel. Bartle
v. Coleman (1888) 33 Mo. App. 470.
180 State ex rel. Roberts v. Springfield School Directors (1881) 74 Mo. 21.
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to reinstate a public school pupil who has been illegally excluded
or expelled,"' or to issue a certificate of graduation in a proper
case where it has been withheld without cause, 32 are of such a
ministerial nature that they may be ordered by mandamus. Like-
wise, where the statute imposes a duty to establish and maintain
certain schools, and conditions are such that compliance there-
with is possible and desirable, the writ may issue to require the
directors to so act.133 Often however because of inadequate funds
or lack of a suitable location the board retains a discretion which
will not be interfered with unless it is arbitrarily exercised. 134
An abuse of discretion was corrected in State ex rel. Kelleher
v. Public Schools'35 where the school board was required to set
aside its appointment of judges and clerks for an election of
school board members, because in appointing only Republicans
"the school board so abused the discretion confided to it that it
was a virtual refusal to perform the duty of holding an impartial
election and in contemplation of law it has refused to act at all."
It was held that mandamus lay to force a proceeding in a lawful
way, and that the mere fact that the board acted as it did was
immaterial.
In another group of cases mandamus has issued against offi-
cials of a municipality to compel them to comply with the ordi-
nance declaring it to be their duty to award contracts to the low-
est bidder. Tholigh a discretion exists in these cases since the
officials are often required to determine the "best" bidder, and
are given power to reject any and all bids, 36 yet the courts have
not hesitated to prevent an abuse of discretion by interfering
when the award is made for purely personal or political pur-
poses. 37
It has also been established that the board of canvassers may
331 State ex rel. Biggs v. Penter (1902) 96 Mo. App. 416, 70 S. W. 375;
In the matter of Rebenack (1895) 62 Mo. App. 8. But it is not illegal ex-
pulsion when there is a failure to comply with the vaccination requirement,
a reasonable rule which it was within the power of the board to make.
232 State ex rel. Roberts v. Wilson (1927) 221 Mo. App. 9, 297 S. W. 419.
183 State ex rel. Best v. Jones (1899) 155 Mo. 570, 56 S. W. 307; State
ex rel. Morehead v. Cartwright (1906) 122 Mo. App. 257, 99 S. W. 48.
134 State ex rel. Mills v. Turnage (1924) 217 Mo. App. 278, 263 S. W.
497; State ex rel. Gehrig v. Medley (Mo. App. 1930) 28 S. W. (2d) 1040;
Corley v. Montgomery (1931) 226 Mo. App. 795, 46 S. W. (2d) 283.
1'1 (1896) 134 Mo. 296, 35 S. W. 617.
136 State ex rel. State Bank v. Hariss (Mo. 1915) 176 S. W. 9; State ex
rel. Montfort v. Meier (1910) 142 Mo. App. 309, 126 S. W. 986.
13T State ex rel. First Natl. Bank v. Bourne (1910) 151 Mo. App. 104,
131 S. W. 896; State ex rel. Journal Printing Co. v. Dreyer (1914) 183
Mo. App. 463, 167 S. W. 1123; State ex rel. Farmers' Bank v. Township
Board (1915) 188 Mo. App. 266, 175 S. W. 139. These cases seem to sug-
gest a possible method of greatly curtailing some of the existing political
corruption.
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be compelled by mandamus to count the returns,1'*8 and when
they have illegally refused to count certain votes, the writ will
issue to compel them to act properly.139 But the mandamus suit
cannot in this respect be made to perform the function of an
election contest. 140
Thus it appears that in almost any case where the court de-
cides that a ministerial duty has been imposed on a public officer,
mandamus is proper to compel the performance of such duty.
Accordingly, the writ has issued to compel the State Auditor to
approve, register, and certify, a proper bond issue,' 4' and against
the record of voters, to allow inspection of the poll books. 142
In certain other cases the courts have expanded their concep-
tion of a ministerial duty in order to give relief merely because
a clear right existed without other adequate remedy. 43 Conse-
quently, to reconcile all the cases on a discretion-nondiscretion
rationale would be impossible. Nevertheless, apparently conflict-
ing decisions may be harmonized with the general rules on the
common bases of justice and public welfare, considerations which
motivate and no doubt justify every deviation from the beaten
paths.
VI. AS INVOKED AGAINST PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AND ASSOCIATIONS
The jurisdiction by mandamus over private corporations is of
ancient origin and is well established; it is exercised where a
specific duty is imposed by law upon a private corporation and
there is no other adequate or specific remedy for its enforce-
ment. 44 In Missouri the writ has performed various functions in
the exercise of this jurisdiction. It was originally invoked against
public service corporations to require them to perform duties
imposed by their charters. In this capacity it has, for instance,
issued against a railroad to prevent interference with the use
138 State ex rel. Metcalf v. Garesche (1877) 65 Mo. 480; State ex rel.
Steadley v. Stuckey (1898) 78 Mo. App. 533.
139 State ex rel. Broadhead v. Berg (1882) 76 Mo. 136.
140 State ex rel. Jamison v. Lesueur (1894) 126 Mo. 413, 29 S. W. 278.
141 State ex rel. School Dist. v. Gordon (1910) 231 Mo. 547, 133 S. W. 44;
State ex rel. Jefferson City v. Hackman (1920) 287 Mo. 156, 229 S. W. 1082.142 State ex rel. Thomas v. Hoblitzelle (1885) 85 Mo. 620. In a somewhat
different case, State ex rel. Public Service Comm. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.
(1919) 280 Mo. 456, 218 S. W. 310, the writ issued at the relation of the
Public Service Commission against a railroad to enforce compliance with an
order of the Commission. (See R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 5185). Though little
used in Missouri such a function of the writ is common elsewhere. 38 C. J.
813.
S43 State ex rel. Holladay v. Withrow (Mo. 1893) 24 S. W. 638; State ex
rel. Martin v. Wofford (1893) 121 Mo. 61, 25 S. W. 851; State ex rel.
Lanyon v. Joplin Water Works (1892) 52 Mo. App. 312.
'44 High, sec. 276-277.
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of a public highway,1.4 or to compel its operation in accordance
with charter requirements ;146 and to compel the telephone and
the water companies to render service to a properly qualified
customer. 147 Later cases have established it as the remedy to
enforce both the common law and statutory rights of sharehold-
ers to inspect the books of the corporation. 1 41 But pursuant to
the general policy of refusing the writ where there is an ade-
quate remedy at law for damages, mandamus to compel a cor-
poration to transfer stock on its books has been refused. 49
Not infrequently mandamus has been employed to ascertain
membership rights, and in this connection both incorporated and
unincorporated organizations have been subjected to its com-
mand. It is the rule that a violated property right is necessary
to relief by mandamus. 150 Thus it has been held that a member
of a mutual benefit society, expelled without due notice and op-
portunity to be heard, may, if he has a property interest in the
society, compel restoration of his privileges by mandamus.'"'
But relief has been denied where mandamus is sought to compel
reinstatement into a voluntary association, such as a medical so-
145 State ex rel. Morris v. H. & St. J. Ry. Co. (1885) 86 Mo. 13.
146 State ex rel. Public Service Comm. v. Railroad Co. (1919) 279 Mo. 455,
214 S. W. 381. See also R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 5185.
147 State ex rel. Payne v. Kinloch Telephone Co. (1902) 93 Mo. App. 349,
67 S. W. 684; State ex rel. Laynon v. Joplin Water Works, supra note
143. See also R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 5227, 5205.
148 Though generally the relator's motive for demanding the right can-
not he inquired into, yet the common law right is subject to the limitations
that it cannot be asserted to an extent detrimental to the interest of the
corporation and the rights of other shareholders. State ex rel. Wilson v.
Railroad Co. (1888) 29 Mo. App. 301. The writ should not be granted for
speculative purposes or to gratify idle curiosity or aid blackmail, but the
mere fact that the relator holds stock in a competing company does notjustify refusal. State ex rel. English v. Lazarus (1907) 127 Mo. App. 401,
105 S. W. 780. And although when the right of inspection is statutory, this
is, as with all statutory rights, regarded as practically absolute, yet it seems
that it is proper to deny mandamus in aid of it when it appears that the
inspection is sought for mere curiosity or for an unlawful purpose such
as to constitute an abuse of the right rather than a legitimate exercise
thereof. State ex rel. Holmes v. Doe Run Lead Co. (Mo. App. 1915) 178
S. W. 298; State ex rel. Haeusler v. Insurance Co. (1912) 169 Mo. App.
354, 152 S. W. 618. See also R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 4550.
149 State ex rel. Bornefeld v. Rombauer (1870) 46 Mo. 155.
150 18 R. C. L. 144, 145; though some courts have taken the view that
the right of membership is per se a property right for the satisfaction of
this requirement (State v. Georgia Medical Society, 1868, 38 Ga. 608) yet
Missouri holds that this must be a valuable severable proprietary right
which may be transferred to others and which would be subject to payment
of debts or descend to heirs. State ex rel. Hyde v. Medical Society (1922)
295 Mo. 144, 243 S. W. 341.
151 Lvsaght v. St. Louis Operative Stonemasons' Assn. (1893) 55 Mo.
App. 538. The requirement that a property right exist was deemed satis-
fied as the laws of the society provided for benefit payments to defray the
funeral expenses of members and their wives.
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ciety, in which the relator has no property rights.152 It has also
been established that if the member admits guilt of an offense
that would warrant his expulsion, mandamus will not perform
the useless function of reinstating him merely that he may be
tried for such offense and then lawfully expelled.2r 3
In accord with the prevailing view it has been held that as
members of an association are subject to the reasonable rules
of the organization concerning tenure of membership, proceed-
ings for mandamus to compel reinstatement will not lie in favor
of a member who has not pursued or exhausted his remedies by
appeal provided by the rules of the society.15
Relief by mandamus has been granted in analogous cases where
a court lacking jurisdiction to do so act has illegally suspended an
attorney from his right to practice in that court,1'2 and where
a child has been unlawfully excluded or expelled from a public
school.156 But when expulsion has been for violation of a rule
alleged to have been prescribed by the board of regents without
authority, it is held that one need not first appeal, as provided by
statute, to that board before invoking the aid of the courts.157
In conclusion, it should be pointed out as supplementary to
what appears in this article, that although the courts have estab-
lished fairly definite rules and principles by which they are to
be guided in passing on an application for a writ of mandamus,
yet from the very nature of things, much still remains to be de-
cided in each particular case. Especially important for the court
is the question of whether particular acts are to be regarded as
ministerial or discretionary and whether in each case of discre-
tion, it has been arbitrarily exercised. Accordingly in proper
cases we have seen the courts refuse the writ because a bare ele-
152 State ex rel. Hyde v. Medical Society, supra note 150. This case
held that merely because the society owned realty, that relator paid dues
and that the membership was valuable in a business and professional way
did not create the necessary property right. In State ex rel. Hynes v.
Catholic Church (1914) 183 Mo. App. 190, 170 S. W. 396, this same doctrine
was invoked by the court as grounds for their refusal to take jurisdiction
of a suit to restore to his position and salary a Catholic priest who claimed
he had been wrongly excommunicated. It was held that no property right
existed and in the absence of such, only the ecclesiastic tribunal had juris-
diction of the controversy.
153 State ex rel. Young v. Temperance Benev. Assn. (1890) 42 Mo. App.
485.
15418 R. C. L. 176; State ex rel. Cammann v. Tower Grove Turn Verein
(Mo. App. 1918) 206 S. W. 242.
155 State ex rel. Storts v. Peabody (1895) 63 Mo. App. 378.
156 State ex rel. Biggs v. Penter (1902) 96 Mo. App. 416, 70 S. W. 375;
In the matter of Rebenack (1895) 62 Mo. App. 8.157 State ex rel. Clark v. Osborne (1887) 24 Mo. App. 309. Probably
sufficiently different facts in this case avoid a conflict with the Tower Grove
Turn Verein case (supra, note 154) ; yet the court does manifest a different
attitude.
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ment of discretion enters into the act sought to be compelled;
on the other hand, what seems to be a field for discretion has
often been deemed ministerial, or at the best, a limited discretion
subject to control for even the slightest abuse. And in almost
countless cases the writ has been issued for little reason other
than that there was a "clear right and no other adequate rem-
edy."
But it seems that this is a step in the proper direction,-a
basis for the writ which should be utilized to an even greater
degree. To the end that when a proper case for relief is pre-
sented it should never be denied unless full justice can be ob-
tained in another action which can be definitely indicated and is
immediately available. It may be advisable that the benefits of
this valuable writ should be made even more accessible by chang-
ing its status to that of an ordinary legal action, available in
any proper case without regard to the existence of another
remedy. Such a step, however, rests ultimately with the legisla-
ture; the courts can do no more than point the way.
I. JAMES WOLF, '35.
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